Canada and the European Union: Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement. CEPS Working Document No. 298/July 2008 by Sarisoy Guerin, Selen. & Napoli, Chris.
 
 
 
Canada and the European Union:  
Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement 
 
 
CEPS Working Document No. 298/July 2008 
 
Selen Sarisoy Guerin and Chris Napoli 
 
 
 
This paper argues that there are significant potential economic gains to be 
obtained from an EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The evolution of trade 
between the US and Canada following the signing of CUSFTA in 1989 offers 
a good illustration of how trade might increase after an EU-Canada FTA, as 
the patterns and levels of protection between the EU and Canada today are 
very similar to the protection that existed between the US and Canada in 
1989. Although many empirical studies fail to find support for ‘trade 
diversion’ created by NAFTA (or CUSFTA) at the expense of the EU and to the 
benefit of the US, there is some evidence of trade diversion when detailed 
regional trade is examined. If indeed trade diversion has occurred due to 
NAFTA, then an EU-Canada FTA is welfare-enhancing for Canada. For the EU, 
a potential FTA can level the playing field with the US and increase the 
competitiveness of European firms in the Canadian market.  
 
 
 
 
CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being 
conducted within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other 
experts in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are 
attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution 
with which they are associated. 
 
 
ISBN-13: 978-92-9079-804-0 
 Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) 
© Selen Sarisoy Guerin and Chris Napoli, 2008Contents 
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................1 
2.  EU and Canadian trade structures and foreign direct investment ..................................................2 
General trade flows........................................................................................................................2 
Canada-EU member state trade flows............................................................................................4 
Canada-EU services trade..............................................................................................................5 
EU-Canada foreign direct investment............................................................................................8 
3. Tariff  barriers.................................................................................................................................9 
4.  Non-tariff barriers, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary standards............13 
5.  Regulatory barriers to trade..........................................................................................................15 
i. Canadian investment tax credits for scientific research............................................................16 
ii. Pharmaceuticals trade..............................................................................................................17 
iii. The EU REACH Directive .....................................................................................................17 
iv. The Green Public Procurement policies of the EU.................................................................18 
v. Taxation procedures and securities legislation.........................................................................19 
6.  Economic arguments for an EU-Canada FTA .............................................................................20 
7. Conclusions..................................................................................................................................23 
References...........................................................................................................................................25 
Appendix.............................................................................................................................................26 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. The EU and Canada’s main trading partners..........................................................................3 
Table 2. Canadian-EU member state trade flows..................................................................................4 
Table 3.Total trade in services for major trading countries, 2005 (€ million)......................................5 
Table 4. Top EU25 services trading partners, 2005 (€ million)............................................................6 
Table 5. Top Canadian services trading partners, 2005 (€ million)......................................................6 
Table 6. Top EU15 services trading partners for Canada, 2005 (€ million).........................................7 
Table 7. Foreign direct investment in the EU and in Canada (€ million).............................................8 
Table 8. EU and Canadian tariffs on imports......................................................................................10 
Table 9. Tariffs and imports by product groups in Canada and the European Communities .............12 
Table 10. Specific barriers for EU exports to Canada* ......................................................................14 
Table 11. Barriers to trade in services.................................................................................................15 
Table 12. Market potential and key economic indicators...................................................................20 
Table 13. The pattern of protection in 1989 and 1994 (for US imports from Canada).......................21 
Table 14. European Union tariff profile ...........................................................................................21 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Evolution of Canadian-EU trade, 1980-2006........................................................................4 
Figure 2. EU-Canada trade in goods and services, 2004-07.................................................................5 
Figure 3. EU services trade with Canada by sector, 2003.................................................................7 | 1 
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CEPS Working Document No. 298/July 2008 
SELEN SARISOY GUERIN AND CHRIS NAPOLI
∗ 
1. Introduction 
A potential free trade agreement (FTA) between Canada and the EU came back onto the 
political agenda during the German EU Presidency, with its emphasis on the importance of 
transatlantic relations not only with the US but also with Canada. Quebec Premier Jean Charest 
has been a strong supporter of closer economic ties between Canada and the EU. In the past, a 
free trade agreement between Canada and the EU was seen as a way to stimulate neglected 
bilateral trade and investment relations, but both parties attached greater importance to 
multilateral trade agreements as the gains from the latter are far superior to any derived from a 
bilateral trade deal. Hence, the idea never materialised as both sides agreed that pursuing an 
FTA would undermine their perceived support for the DDA (Doha Development Agenda) 
negotiations taking place under the auspices of the WTO (World Trade Organisation). 
One year after the EU-Canada summit in July 2007, talks on a free trade agreement are still on 
the agenda. Canadian politicians and officials are hopeful that negotiations can start as early as 
the next Canada-EU summit in Montreal in October 2008. Canadian Trade Minister David 
Emerson was quoted recently as saying that a trade deal would not only give Canada access to a 
huge and diverse democratic market with technological sophistication but could also offer 
Europe a stable supplier of energy. European diplomats and officials, however, are more 
cautious. A joint study by both sides is now underway to quantify the potential benefits and 
costs from an EU-Canada FTA.  
Canada and the EU have a longstanding economic relationship that dates back to 1958 when 
Canada accredited its first ambassador to the then European Economic Communities (EEC). 
The Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation, signed with Canada in 
1976, was the EEC’s first framework cooperation agreement with an industrialised country. 
Under this agreement, Canada and the EEC accorded most-favoured nation (MFN) status to 
each other in all product categories and agreed on cooperating for “the development and 
prosperity of their respective industries, the encouragement of technological and scientific 
progress, the opening up of new sources of supply and new markets, the creation of new 
employment opportunities, the reduction of regional disparities, the protection and improvement 
of the environment, and to contribute to the development of their respective economies and 
standards of living”.  
Two decades later, the economic cooperation was strengthened with the approval of the EU-
Canada Joint Declaration and Action Plan in 1996 and the EU-Canada Trade Initiative (ECTI) 
in 1998. The Action Plan set an agenda for joint action using the established instruments for 
cooperation. The Plan was organised into four chapters: economic and trade relations, foreign 
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policy and security issues, transnational issues and fostering links. Moreover, the EU and 
Canada concluded several agreements covering the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment, fisheries, veterinary issues, labelling of wines and spirits, competition, e-commerce, 
public procurement, services, atomic energy and nuclear research matters. 
More recently, the EU and Canada adopted the Canada-EU Partnership Agenda, which 
identifies broad areas that would improve their bilateral relationship. The agenda included the 
Framework of the Canada-EU Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA), which 
sought to move beyond traditional market access issues, to include areas such as trade and 
investment facilitation, competition, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, financial 
services, e-commerce, temporary entry, small- and medium-sized enterprises, sustainable 
development, civil society consultation, and science and technology.
1 TIEA negotiations began 
in 2004, but it was decided in May 2006 to make continuation conditional on the results of the 
current round of WTO negotiations. In their joint communiqués, Canada and the EU declared 
themselves to share a commitment to broad trade policy objectives, notably the commitment to 
the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, the formation of a strong, open and rule-based 
international trading system and the promotion of sustainable development.  
At the June 2007 Canada-EU Summit in Berlin, it was decided to re-launch the TIEA dialogue 
and further strengthen the bilateral economic integration and trade and investment flows. Both 
parties agreed “to enhance regulatory convergence and compatibility, by considering each 
other’s measures before adopting unique approaches”, a commitment that also exists in the 
context of the EU-US dialogue. A Regulatory Cooperation Agreement should therefore be 
concluded as soon as possible under the TIEA.
2  
The aim of this report is to present a general discussion on the economic rationale for a potential 
EU-Canada FTA. As a first step, we examine patterns of trade flows in goods and services and 
FDI between Canada and the EU in section 2. This is important to see whether the EU and 
Canada are natural trading partners or not. If the answer is positive, then trade diversion from a 
free trade agreement is said to be minimised. In section 3, tariff barriers to trade between the EU 
and Canada are examined in detail. Although tariffs on average are low thanks to past WTO 
rounds, aggregate categories and averages hide several tariff peaks. Section 4 proceeds with an 
examination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS), and section 5 discusses key regulatory issues. Having established 
a general view of various forms of trade barriers, we present the arguments for and against an 
EU-Canada FTA in section 6. Section 7 offers conclusions.  
2.  EU and Canadian trade structures and foreign direct investment 
General trade flows 
One of the most striking differences between the trade patterns3 of the EU and Canada is 
undoubtedly the significant weight of the US as both an export and import market for Canada. 
As Table 1 shows, although the United States is the EU’s largest trading partner, it only 
accounts for roughly 23% of the EU’s exports and 13% of imports. For Canada, however, 
82.5% of Canadian exports were sent to the United States in 2006, and almost 55.6% of its 
                                                      
1 For background information on the Canada-EU TIEA, see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
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imports came from the United States, according to statistics compiled by DG Trade of the 
European Commission. 
With respect to Canada-EU trade, the table below shows that despite the dominance of the 
United States, the EU is Canada’s second-largest trading partner. In terms of the EU, Canada 
was the 8
th largest destination for exports, the 14
th largest import partner and the 10
th largest 
trading partner overall in 2006.  
Table 1. The EU and Canada’s top 10 trading partners, 2006 
European Union  Canada 
  (€ mil)  %      (€ mil)  % 
World   2,516.6    
100.0    World    609.6   100.0  
US   444.4    17.7   US    421.9   69.2  
China    255.1    10.1    EU    56.2   9.2  
Russia    209    8.3    China    31.8   5.2  
Switzerland    157.7    6.3   Japan  18.2   3.0  
Japan    121.1    4.8   Mexico  15.1  2.5 
Norway    117.2    4.7    Korea    6.7   1.1  
Turkey    85    3.4   Norway  5.5  0.9 
Korea    61.1    2.4   Algeria  3.9  0.6 
India    46.4    1.8   Brazil  3.5  0.6 
Canada    46.1    1.8    India    2.6   0.4  
Source: DG Trade, European Commission. 
The first set of two figures below shows how trade has evolved between Canada and the EU 
from 1980 to 2006.4 Canada’s imports from the EU levelled off after the Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA) was signed in 1989, but they started increasing right after the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994. Imports from the EU have 
increased from 6.1 billion USD in 1980 to 47.8 billion USD in 2006, at an average growth rate 
of 8%. Canada’s exports to the EU also increased over the last two decades at an average annual 
growth rate of 5%. Exports to the EU amounted to 9.2 billion USD in 1980 and 25.6 billion 
USD in 2006. The negative impact of CUSFTA on exports to the EU can be seen in the second 
set of graphs in Figure 1 below. However, the share of imports and exports to the EU as a 
percent of Canada’s global trade reveals two important points: first in terms of imports, the 
share of the EU in Canada’s total imports has been more or less stable, with a short period of 
increased openness during the time of CUSFTA. This can be explained as the classic impact of 
trade liberalisation: by liberalising trade, Canada became more open and hence attracted larger 
imports. Second, the share of the EU as Canada’s export destination has been decreasing 
steadily over the years.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of Canadian-EU trade, 1980-2006 
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Canada-EU member state trade flows 
There is a wide dispersion in the trade pattern of the different member states with Canada. 
Canada has a large trade deficit with Germany and to a lesser degree with France, Italy and 
Sweden. Canada-UK trade is relatively balanced whereas the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and 
Finland are net importers from Canada. Top export destinations within the EU are the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium. EU countries that export the most to 
Canada are Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Ireland.  
Table 2. Canadian-EU member state trade flows (millions of Canadian dollars) 
Top EU destinations for Canadian exports    Top EU exporters to Canada 
  2005 2006 2007   2005 2006  2007
United Kingdom  8,253   10,134  13,060  Germany  10,272   11,126   11,538 
Netherlands  2,193   3,063  4,047  United Kingdom  10,417   10,864   11,471 
Germany  3,237   3,955  3,883  France   4,995   5,186   5,088 
France   2,537   2,882  3,126  Italy  4,586   4,911   5,074 
Belgium  2,287   2,402  2,964  Ireland  2,054   2,556   2,464 
Italy   1,927   1,883  2,568  Belgium  1,793   1,960   2,354 
Spain  1,195   1,190  1,234  Sweden  2,296   2,355   2,100 
Finland  433   474  716  Netherlands  1,528   1,591   1,765 
Sweden  482   457  545  Austria  1,290   1,423   1,435 
Denmark  290   313  499  Denmark  1,565   1,421   1,314 
Source: Statcan. CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 5 
 
In terms of the breakdown of goods traded, Canada essentially exports commodities to the EU, 
in return for oil and manufactured goods. Canada’s top exports to the EU in 2007 were uranium, 
gold, nickel oxide sinters, unsorted diamonds and aircraft. The EU’s top exports to Canada were 
crude oil and related refined products, medicines, motor vehicles and airplane parts (see the 
appendix for detailed information). The importance of crude oil exports to Canada may seem 
surprising in the context of the growing oil exploration in Western Canada (Alberta), but it is 
easier to ship North Sea oil to Eastern Canada than to get it overland from the West. 
Canada-EU services trade 
Services trade (exports plus imports) in the world has been growing by 8% on average since 
1994, and it has increased from 2.2 trillion USD to 5.5 trillion USD from 1994 to 2006. The 
majority of services trade has been taking place among the developed countries as these 
countries have a comparative advantage in many services sectors. In 2005, the EU25 was the 
largest exporter and importer of services in the world, where it accounted for 28.3% of global 
exports and 24.7% of global imports. The EU was followed by the United States (19%), Japan 
(6.7%) China (4.4%) and Canada (3.3%).  
Table 3.Total trade in services for major trading countries, 2005 (€ million) 
Country  Exports  Imports  Balance  Share of world (%) 
EU25 406,292  349,357  56,935  25.9 
United States  302,860  252,853  50,007  19 
Japan 88,586  107,914  -19,328  6.7 
China 59,805  67,354  -7,549  4.4 
Canada 43,121  52,211  -9,090  3.3 
Singapore 41,241  43,614  -2,373 2.9 
Source: EU International Trade in Services, Eurostat, 2007. 
In a bilateral context, services trade has also increased between the EU and Canada: total 
services trade increased by 33%, from €15.4 billion in 2004 to €20.5 billion in 2007. In 2007, 
total services trade between the EU and Canada accounted for 30% of total trade in goods and 
services, and services trade has been increasing at a similar rate to goods trade.  
Figure 2. EU-Canada trade in goods and services, 2004-07 
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In terms of the geographical distribution of trade in services, the EU’s top services trading 
partner is the United States, where total services trade between the two countries exceeded €238 
billion in 2005. Following the United States, the EU’s next largest services trading partners are 
Switzerland, Japan and Norway. Canada is the EU’s seventh largest partner in services trade, 
with total trade equalling roughly €16 billion in 2005.  
Table 4. Top EU25 services trading partners, 2005 (€ million) 
Country Exports  Imports  Balance Total  services  trade 
United States  122,872  115,967  6,905  238,839 
Switzerland  49,565 36,677 12,888  86,242 
Japan 19,969  11,871  8,098  31,840 
Norway  15,117 9,668 5,449  24,785 
China  11,109 8,848 2,261  19,957 
Russia  11,444 8,125 3,319  19,569 
Canada 8,474  7,642  832  16,116 
Turkey 4,456  10,636  -6,180  15,092 
Source: EU International Trade in Services, Eurostat, 2007. 
The EU is Canada’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. In 2005, Canada 
exported roughly €7.45 billion worth of services to the EU, while receiving imports of roughly 
€8.1 billion. This gave Canada a €650 million services trade deficit with the EU.  
Table 5. Top Canadian services trading partners, 2005 (€ million) 
Country Exports  Imports  Balance Total  services  trade 
United States   23,836  29,844  -6,008  53,679 
EU15 7,454  8,102  -648  15,557 
Japan   960  1,502  -542  2,462 
Bermuda   1,006  944  63  1,950 
Hong Kong, China   569  1,130  -561  1,699 
Barbados   690  731  -41  1,421 
Mexico 403  779  -376  1,182 
China   619  520  100  1,139 
Switzerland   438  423  16  861 
Source: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2008. 
EU-Canada services trade is dominated by trade between Canada and the United Kingdom. 
Services trade between Canada and the United Kingdom accounts for roughly 35% of total 
Canada-EU services trade. Canada’s next top EU trading partners are France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy.  
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Table 6. Top EU15 services trading partners for Canada, 2005 (€ million) 
Country Exports  Imports  Balance Total  services  trade 
United Kingdom   4561  4211  350  8772 
France   1617  1854  -237  3471 
Germany   1594  1653  -59  3247 
Netherlands   774  1176  -402  1950 
Italy   450  996  -546  1446 
Greece   344  1002  -658  1346 
Ireland    554 300 254  854 
Spain   388  345  43  733 
Sweden    510 190 320  700 
Belgium/Luxemburg 244  265  -21  509 
Austria   161  229  -68  390 
Denmark    232 113 119  345 
Portugal   138  149  -11  287 
Finland   79  193  -114  272 
Poland   102  93  9  195 
Source: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2008. 
Figure 3. EU services trade with Canada by sector, 2003 
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Source: Eurostat. 
In terms of the sub-sectors of services, the above figure shows that services trade between the 
EU and Canada are dominated by services trade in transportation and travel services. The EU 
exported €2.1 billion of transportation services, €1.9 billion of travel services, €592 million of 
insurance services and €420 million of financial services. The EU was a net exporter of 
transportation, insurance, finance, legal/accounting, communication and agricultural services 
and a net importer of travel, royalties and license fees, construction, advertising, R&D, 
government and other services from Canada in 2003. 
In analysing trade in services, it is seen that the EU is an important player for Canada. Not only 
is the EU the second-largest services trade partner for Canada, EU-Canada services trade is 
larger than Canada’s service trade with its next eight partners combined. From the EU’s 
perspective, although less significant, Canada is also an important services trade partner.  8 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
EU-Canada foreign direct investment 
Canada is a net importer of EU foreign direct investment (FDI) and is among the top 10 FDI 
partners of the EU. By the end of 2006, FDI inward stocks in the EU (excluding intra-EU27 
FDI) from around the world had reached €2.04 trillion. Among the source countries of FDI to 
the EU, Canada ranks in fourth place, with accumulated FDI stocks of €80 billion 
(approximately 4% of total inward FDI stocks in the EU). In return the EU has outward FDI 
stocks of €119 billion in Canada, roughly equivalent to 4% of total EU outward FDI stocks in 
the world. Canada is the third largest destination for EU FDI. In comparative terms, inward 
stocks of FDI in Canada from the EU are 13% of EU FDI stocks in the US, roughly proportional 
to the size of the two respective economies. However, the more important question is whether 
Canada invests as much in the US as it invests in the EU. 
Table 7. Foreign direct investment in the EU and in Canada (€ million) 
FDI stocks in the EU       FDI stocks from the EU    
Country  2006  % of total   Country  2006  % of total
All countries 
(excl. intra-EU27) 
2,043,258   100.0%   All countries 
(excl. intra-EU27) 
2,705,731   100.0%
United States   952,875   46.6%   United States   934,293   34.5%
Switzerland   245,194   12.0%   Switzerland   333,203   12.3%
Japan   99,145   4.9%   Canada   119,564   4.4%
Canada   80,804   4.0%   Brazil   88,001   3.3%
Norway   62,911   3.1%   Hong Kong   83,417   3.1%
Singapore   40,041   2.0%   Japan   75,516   2.8%
Australia   17,205   0.8%   Singapore   54,317   2.0%
Hong Kong   16,365   0.8%   Russian Federation   52,153   1.9%
Russian Federation   12,577   0.6%   Australia   50,587   1.9%
Source: Eurostat. 
FDI stocks in Canada      FDI stocks from Canada   
Country  2006  % of total    Country  2006  % of total 
All countries   284,841   100%    All countries   332,050   100% 
United States   173,671   61%    United States   141,881   43% 
EU25   66,245   23%    EU25   91,626   28% 
Switzerland   8,947   3%    Barbados   24,366   7% 
Japan   7,170   3%    Bermuda   9,899   3% 
Brazil   5,965   2%    Australia   6,091   2% 
Hong Kong   3,807   1%    Cayman Islands   5,584   2% 
Source: Statcan. 
Table 7 clearly shows the US dominance in both inward and outward FDI stocks of Canada. 
From Canada’s perspective, the EU is the second largest FDI investor in terms of end-2006 FDI 
stocks; its share in total FDI inward stocks of Canada is 23%. The EU is also in second place 
after the US in terms of Canada’s outward FDI stocks, accounting for 28% of its FDI outward CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 9 
 
stocks in the world (2006). The large difference between the share of the US versus that of the 
EU in Canada’s outward and inward FDI stocks warrants further examination. 
On the basis of a simple exercise, one can ascertain whether the fact that the US is a 
disproportionately larger FDI partner compared to the EU is attributable to major determinants 
of FDI. According to gravity models of international trade, two countries’ trade is directly 
proportional to the size of their respective economies (usually measured by the GDP of each 
partner) and inversely proportional to the distance between the two. Gravity models have 
become popular in recent years in determining the patterns of FDI as well. In very rough terms, 
the size of FDI flows (or stocks) should be proportional to the size of the EU and Canada and 
inversely proportional to the distance between the EU and Canada (ceteris paribus). One 
striking implication of this exercise is that a country of similar size to the EU (i.e. the US) 
should also trade in direct investment assets in similar magnitudes given its distance (minus the 
advantage of sharing a common border and language). In other words, based on market size, 
since the EU is approximately as large as the US (the EU27 GDP was exactly 1.11 times that of 
the US in 2006),
5 one might question the fact that the EU receives only 65% of the total FDI 
that Canada invests in the US. However, given that the distance between the EU and Canada is 
twice that between the US and Canada,
6 it is normal that the EU receives less FDI from Canada 
than the US. However, this simple exercise disregards many other factors that facilitate and/or 
hinder trade in assets. According to the empirical literature, a free trade agreement between two 
countries tends to encourage FDI.  
In the absence of a free trade agreement that covers investment, many countries have signed 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The most important reason for signing such treaties is to 
ensure investor protection against arbitrary changes in the host country legislation, ‘national 
treatment’ of foreign investors and, in extreme cases, protection against expropriation.
7 As a 
brief examination of the UNCTAD database on BITs reveals, Canada does not have any BITs 
with the EU15, but only with some new member states,
8 which indicates that the investment 
environment in the EU15 is already secure and stable. However, there are still some restrictions 
on investment that hinder trade in assets between Canada and the EU. For example, there are 
foreign participation limitations on banking and financial services in Canada. A lack of SME 
logistical capacity to invest in the Canadian market is also mentioned as a barrier to investment 
in Canada by the Europeans (Dehousse et al., 2002). Canadian investment tax credits for 
scientific research available to Canadian companies but not to foreign companies discriminate 
against foreign investors. Similar tax incentives also exist in the EU. Therefore, harmonisation 
or the extension of a ‘national treatment’ clause as part of an FTA can increase FDI flows on 
both sides. 
3. Tariff  barriers 
It is true that over the last decade, tariffs have been decreasing due to multilateral negotiations at 
the WTO level, and the average tariff rates on industrial goods in the developed countries are at 
an all-time low. For the EU25, the MFN applied tariffs rates were 5.4% on average (industrial 
                                                      
5 WEO database, IMF, April 2008.  
6 That is, if one takes the UK as the economic centre of the EU. For Canada this may be acceptable since 
within the EU, the UK is Canada’s main trading partner.  
7 Although the incidence of expropriation has decreased dramatically since the 1970s, there still remain 
investor concerns over nationalisation even in the absence of a crisis, such as Bolivia’s nationalisation of 
its gas and oil resources in 2006. 
8 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia and Romania have signed BITs with Canada. 10 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
and agricultural goods), with 15.1% on agricultural commodities and only 3.9% on industrial 
goods, compared to Canada’s tariff rates of 17.3% on agricultural goods and 3.9% on industrial 
goods. Table 8 presents EU and Canadian tariffs on imports, but note that the data are expressed 
as averages and may therefore hide tariff peaks that exist at a more disaggregate level.  
Some 20.4% of Canada’s exports to the EU are tariff-free, and the remaining 79.6% carry tariffs 
ranging from below 5% to over 25%, occasionally exceeding 200% in selective product lines. 
However, since exports in tariff-free lines constitute 74.1% of Canada’s exports to the EU, 
technically a majority of EU-Canada trade is tariff-free (WTO, 2006). Again when one 
examines the tariff rates more closely for the top 25 products traded between the EU and 
Canada (see below), one might have the impression that most trade between the EU and Canada 
is tariff-free. This in turn may imply that the gains from an FTA would be moderate. This 
conclusion is based on simple trade theory: the more protectionist a country is, the higher the 
gains are from tariff liberalisation. This is also true if a country liberalises its trade unilaterally. 
From the table below, one can see that for Canada’s top 25 exports to the EU, only unwrought 
aluminium faces tariffs, and for the top 25 exports of the EU to Canada, motor vehicles of 
engine capacity of 1500cc and above, auto parts, light oils and preparations, and a few other 
items face tariffs ranging between 5-10%. One thing that this exercise does not reveal is whether 
there are any tariffs applied by both sides that are prohibitively high such that those goods are 
not traded, or are under-traded.  
Table 8. EU and Canadian tariffs on imports 
Canada’s exports to the EU – Top 25 products  Tariff applied by the EU 
710812 - gold in unwrought form (non-monetary)  free 
284410 - natural uranium and its compounds (incl alloys, dispersions, ceramic products etc.) free 
880240 - aircraft nes of an unladen weight (more than 15,000 kg)  free 
710210 - diamonds - unsorted - not mounted or set  free 
270112 - bituminous coal - whether or not pulverized but not agglomerated  free 
750120 - nickel oxide sinters and other intermediate products of nickel metallurgy  free 
851790 - parts of electrical apparatus for line telephone or line telegraphy  free 
880230 – airplanes of an unladen weight (2, 000 - 15,000 kg)  free 
260112 - iron ores and concentrates, other than roasted iron pyrites - agglomerated  free 
470321 – chemical woodpulp - soda or sulphate - coniferous, bleached  free 
710231 - diamonds - non-industrial - unworked - not mounted or set  free 
750210 - unwrought nickel - not alloyed  free 
711230 - ash containing precious metal or precious-metal compounds   free 
841191 - parts of turbo-jets or turbo-propellers  free 
760110 - unwrought aluminum - not alloyed  6% 
480100 - newsprint - in rolls or sheets  free 
880330 - parts of airplanes or helicopters nes  free 
271019 - other petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; 
preparations nes  free 
852520 - transmission/reception apparatus - for cb/amateur radios, fax, cellular phones, etc.  free 
970110 – paintings, drawings and pastels executed by hand  free 
440710 - lumber (thickness >6mm) - coniferous wood  free 
851750 - modems and other apparatus for carrier-current line systems or for digital line 
systems nes  free 
880529 - other air combat simulators and parts   free 
300490 - medicaments nes - in dosage  free 
100110 - durum wheat  free CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 11 
 
Canada’s imports from the EU – Top 25 products  Tariff applied by Canada 
270900 - crude petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals  free 
300490 - medicaments nes - in dosage  free 
870323 - motor vehicles - spark ignition - cylinder capacity 1500-3000 cc  6.1% 
271011 - light oils and preparations  free - 5% - 8% 
870324 - motor vehicles - spark ignition - cylinder capacity more than 3000 cc  6.1% 
880330 - parts of airplanes or helicopters nes  free 
293410 - heterocyclic compounds containing an unfused thiazole ring in the structure  6.5% 
220421 - grape wines - other than sparkling (including fortified) - 2 litres or less  changes from 3.74 cents/lt 
to 17.2 cents/litre according 
to alcohol level 
$1.10/litre + 15% if alcohol 
level exceeds 22.9% 
841191 - parts of turbo-jets or turbo-propellers  free 
870190 - other wheeled tractors nes  free 
843149 - parts of cranes, work-trucks, shovels and other construction machinery  free 
850300 - parts for electric motors, generators, generating sets and rotary converters  free 
220300 - beer made from malt  free 
841112 - turbo-jets - thrust exceeding 25 kn  free 
848180 - taps, cocks, valves and other similar appliances, nes  free 
300210 - antisera and other blood fractions - therapeutic, diagnostic, prophylactic uses  free 
841199 - parts of gas turbines nes  free - 2% 
293399 - benzimidazole-2-thiol  6.5% 
870899 - other motor vehicle parts nes  free - 6% 
870410 – dumpers designed for off-highway use  free 
271019 - other petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; 
preparations nes  free - 5% - 8% 
300439 - hormones nes other than antibiotics or contraceptives - in dosage  free 
490199 - printed books, brochures, directories and booklets (other than dictionaries and 
encyclopedias)  free 
844319 - offset printing machinery - other type nes  free 
300390 - medicaments (bulk) nes  free 
 
As a first step, one can analyse average tariffs applied by both sides. The first of the two tables 
below, from the World Tariffs Profiles report of the WTO (2006) on Canadian and EU tariffs, 
reveals that both industrial and agricultural goods face tariffs under these broad categories. It is 
true for both Canada and the EU that tariffs are low(er) on industrial goods compared to 
agricultural goods, but even in industrial goods there may be MFN tariff peaks reaching 25 
(22)%, for example on transport equipment in Canada (the EU). The tables below reveal that 
there are sensitive products on both sides where high tariffs exist, such as dairy products with an 
average MFN tariff rate of 248.6% (a peak of 349%) entering Canada or 53.8% average MFN 
rate (peak of 229%) entering the EU. Such tariff peaks are more prevalent in agricultural and 
fish and fish products mostly. However, there are tariff peaks in excess of 10% in every non-
agricultural goods category both in Canada and the EU, excluding petroleum. Within each 
product category, there are many goods with zero tariffs as well as non-zero tariffs: for example, 
within the ‘dairy products’ category, all items have non-zero tariff rates, and hence the imports 
into Canada are nil and only 0.1% into the EU. This is one extreme example. Other sensitive 
items include clothing for both Canada and the EU, and textiles for the EU. Another interesting 
case is the example of the wood and paper industry. Products of the wood and paper industry 
entering the EU face low tariff rates (1.1% average with a peak of 10%) with 80.3% of products 
tariff-free that fall under this category. This simple exercise shows that EU-Canada trade is not 12 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
tariff-free and a simple correlation between average MFN rates and import shares indicate a 
negative relationship.
9 
Besides the economic cost of tariffs, they can also introduce uncertainty into trade. Although 
average tariffs on non-agricultural goods are low, each product category contains many sub-
category products that have tariffs. This would require preparation of detailed paperwork to 
categorise the product to determine which tariff rate it falls under. As such, tariffs function as a 
significant bureaucratic hurdle that can increase the time it takes for a product to be exported. In 
fact, a 2006 survey by the Conference Board of Canada reported that 51% of Canadian 
exporters to the EU identified tariffs as a challenge, particularly for mechanical equipment, food 
and seafood.
10  
Table 9. Tariffs and imports by product groups in Canada and the European Communities 
Canada            
Product groups   Final bound duties      MFN applied duties   Imports   
 AVG  Duty-free 
in % 
Max Binding
in % 
AVG Duty-free
in % 
Max Share 
in % 
Duty-free
in % 
Animal products    33.2    42.0   680   100   29.6   64.1   681    0.4    62.6 
Dairy products  220.4  0 349 100 248.6 0 349  0  0
Fruit, vegetables, 
plants  
 3.3    60.5   19   100   3.3   60.8   19    1.7    83.5 
Coffee, tea    7.5    55.0   265   100   10.4   76.4   265    0.5    70.6 
Cereals & preparations   20.3    15.9   277   100   20.1   32.2   277    1.0    20.8 
Oilseeds, fats & oils    5.2    53.1   218   100   4.9   56.4   218    0.4    66.9 
Sugars and 
confectionery  
 7.5    7.8   31   100   5.7   28.1   28    0.2    7.0 
Beverages & tobacco    7.8    23.8   256   100   7.2   34.4   256    0.8    27.0 
Cotton    0.8    90.0   8   100   0.5   90.0   5    0.0    95.3 
Other agricultural 
products  
 7.1    73.1   600   100   6.9   79.4   600    0.4    50.7 
Fish & fish products   1.2  75.5 11 100 1 79.3 11  0.6  78
Minerals & metals   2.7  50.4 16 99.5 1.7 67.9 16 12.6  70.3
Petroleum    6.9    0   8   50.0   2.7   58.7   8    6.5    98.3 
Chemicals    4.4    27.5   11   100   2.8   50.2   16    10.8    40.0 
Wood, paper, etc.    1.4    79.3   16   100   1.1   83.6   16    5.3    81.4 
Textiles    10.6    9.8   18   100   6.9   45.0   18    1.8    10.9 
Clothing    17.2    0.9   18   100   17.0   2.8   18    1.9    0.2 
Leather, footwear, etc.    7.6    24.1   20   100   5.6   40.1   20    2.2    19.5 
Non-electrical 
machinery  
 3.4    46.4   14   100   1.5   74.9   10    16.6    74.9 
Electrical machinery    4.3    36.4   11   100   2.4   56.4   11    9.6    66.1 
Transport equipment   5.6  28.1 16 94.3 5.8 40.7 25  20.2  11.8
Manufactures, n.e.s.   4  41.2 18 99.8 2.8 56.9 18  6.4  69.6
                                                      
9 The correlation coefficient calculated for the EU is higher (-0.44) than that of Canada (-0.22) but both 
are negative, indicating that the higher the tariffs are the lower the import shares in those product 
categories. Both correlation coefficients are low. This is due to the aggregate nature of the data in the 
tables above. More disaggregate data would reveal a stronger negative correlation. 
10 Conference Board of Canada (2006), “Lost over the Atlantic? The Canada-EU Trade and Investment 
Relationship”, p. 17 (http://sso.conferenceboard.ca/e-Library/temp/BoardWise2PHOGBPJDDFHFGDIE 
ABHPAPKI200842455126/174-06%20Canada-EU%20Trade%20Investment-RPT%20for%20web.pdf). CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 13 
 
European Communities           
Product groups  Final bound duties    MFN applied duties     Imports   
 AVG    Duty-free 
in % 
Max Binding
in % 
AVG  Duty-free 
in % 
Max  Share 
in %  
Duty-free
in % 
Animal products    26.7    20.6   219   100   25.4   23.2   219    0.5    16.2 
Dairy products    56.9    0   264   100   53.8   0   229    0.1    0 
Fruit, vegetables, 
plants  
 10.7    22.6   199   100   11.8   21.4   195    1.3    16.1 
Coffee, tea    6.5    27.1   43   100   6.5   27.1   43    0.8    78.8 
Cereals & preparations   29.1    6.3   139   100   25.6   5.8   139    0.4    2.6 
Oilseeds, fats & oils    5.8    48.2   87   100   5.9   46.8   87    1.4    70.5 
Sugars and 
confectionery  
 32.6    0   134   100   32.9   0   134    0.2    0 
Beverages & tobacco    23.2    23.0   208   100   20.2   19.8   192    0.7    15.9 
Cotton    0.0    100.0   0   100   0.0   100.0   0    0.1    100.0 
Other agricultural 
products  
 5.1    66.4   125   100   5.3   64.8   125    0.6    71.5 
Fish & fish products   11.2 10.7 26 100 10.3 15.9 26  1.3  5.8
Minerals & metals   2  49.5 12 100 1.9 50.7 12 17.2  70.5
Petroleum    2.0    50.0   5   100   2.7   31.1   5    21.0    95.3 
Chemicals    4.6    20.0   13   100   4.6   20.2   17    9.6    45.5 
Wood, paper, etc.    0.9    84.1   10   100   1.1   80.3   10    3.5    84.3 
Textiles    6.5    3.4   12   100   6.6   3.1   12    2.7    2.1 
Clothing    11.5    0   12   100   11.5   0   12    5.6    0 
Leather, footwear, etc.    4.2    27.8   17   100   4.2   25.7   17    2.6    14.4 
Non-electrical 
machinery  
 1.7    26.5   10   100   1.7   28.1   10    8.8    61.0 
Electrical machinery    2.4    31.5   14   100   2.5   31.2   14    8.8    60.4 
Transport equipment   4.1  15.7 22 100 4.1 17 22  6.2  18.6
Manufactures, n.e.s.  2.5  25.9 14 100 2.4 26.9 14 6.6  51.3
Source: WTO (2006), “World Tariff Profiles”, Geneva. 
The current structure of trade between the EU and Canada is endogeneously determined by 
tariff barriers (as well as non-tariff barriers), which are pervasive in all product categories. 
Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that there will be no gains from tariff liberalisation between 
EU and Canada. The gains from tariff elimination can be maximised if tariff peaks can also be 
removed on both sides; otherwise the gains will likely be small. Also a potential EU-Canada 
FTA should include agricultural goods eliminating tariffs on most products acknowledging 
sensitive items from both sides. 
4. Non-tariff  barriers,  technical  barriers to trade and sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards 
Unquestionably one of the most important achievements of the WTO has been to lower tariff 
barriers as well as to bring certainty into the world trading system by binding tariffs at a certain 
level. As a result, especially for trade between developed countries, tariffs are no longer 
considered to be the main obstacle. Instead, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) – such as import 
licensing, customs valuation rules, pre-shipment inspection, rules of origin and investment 14 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
measures – technical barriers to trade (TBTs) in industrial goods and sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards (SPS) in agricultural products – such as domestic standardisation rules, double-
testing, special labelling requirements and certification procedures – are believed to hinder trade 
more. 
Specifically, for Canadian exporters the main barriers appear to be with respect to packaging, 
labelling, certification (i.e. TBTs), and health and safety standards (i.e. SPS). For the EU, the 
main regulatory barriers involve obtaining sanitary approval for foodstuffs, regulations on 
spirits (i.e. SPS), labelling and packaging requirements for products and differences in technical 
and safety standards (TBTs). Below is a summary table of specific barriers to trade reported by 
EU exporters to Canada (2002).  
Table 10. Specific barriers for EU exports to Canada* 
Product Problem 
All cheeses  The importation of cheese is limited to a quota of 20.5 million 
tonnes, which is insufficient and the quota management is not 
efficient. 
Veterinary certificates required for imports of EU cheese are difficult 
to obtain. Delays and burdensome procedures create important 
additional costs for exporters. 
Butter  The quota for butter is considered insufficient. EU companies cannot 
gain market share on the Canadian market. 
Prosciutto di Parma  Trademark “Parma” is owned by a Canadian company. EU 
companies cannot export their product using their EU geographical 
indication “Parma”. Additional costs reduce market share. 
Burdensome judicial procedures for the recognition of their 
geographical indications. 
Various foodstuffs  Problems regarding specific labelling and packaging requirements 
for foodstuffs (nutritional labelling, more detailed product 
description requirements). Additional costs for EU companies. 
Packaging requirements - compulsory container size for some 
products, canned products requirements. Additional costs for EU 
companies obliged to use specific containers for Canada. 
Wines and spirits  Discrimination in subsidies, as subsidies are alleged to be granted to 
domestic wines. 
Problems regarding the intellectual property protection for wines, 
spirits and European products with specific geographical 
denomination. Loss of market share. 
Textiles, footwear, electrical 
products, recreational boats 
Existence of high tariffs for these products hampers the access of EU 
products to the Canadian market. 
Electrical products, cars, 
motorcycles 
Technical standards: EU companies experienced additional delays 
and costs (standards difficult to obtain, costs to conform with the 
standards). 
Pharmaceuticals and 
veterinary medicines 
Approval procedure is very long. Additional costs and delays, 
because tests performed in the EU are not recognised. 
Cosmetics  Differences in labelling requirements between the EU and Canada 
oblige EU companies to prepare new labels and to take on additional 
costs. 
Chemical products  Labelling of chemical products is considered complex. Cost related 
to differences between EU and Canadian requirements. 
Heaters, valves, pumps, 
faucets, hoods 
According to EU companies, technical standards are not transparent 
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Barriers to investment  Problem 
All general investment 
activities 
SMEs do not always have the required logistical capacity to invest in 
the Canadian market 
* The Conference Board of Canada has created a similar table that describes the specific restrictions on Canadian 
exports to the EU. 
Source: Dehousse et al. (2002). 
5.  Regulatory barriers to trade 
‘Beyond the border’ issues, such as regulatory barriers to trade, have also attracted considerable 
attention recently. One reason for this is that as developed countries are relatively more 
competitive in services, they are more and more interested in accessing new markets for their 
service providers. And since services are by their nature tariff-free, it is the divergence in 
domestic regulation that deters trade in services. Although both the EU and Canada have 
extensive GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) commitments, there are some issues 
raised as trade irritants. Below is a table on some barriers to trade in services reported by EU 
exporters to Canada (Dehousse et al., 2002).  
Table 11. Barriers to trade in services 
Service Problem 
Construction   The requirements for social insurance in Canada for temporary workers 
Banking and finance  Limitations on foreign participation  
Telecommunications  Limitations on foreign participation  
All general services  Long delays in application procedures for visas and work permits 
Complicated requirements for obtaining a driving licence, which create 
difficulties for physical persons established in Canada 
The non-recognition of previous banking experience of companies is a 
problem for new companies wishing to establish in Canada 
* The Conference Board of Canada has created a similar table that describes the specific restrictions on the export of 
Canadian services to the EU. 
Source: Dehousse et al. (2002). 
As mentioned above, part of the EU-Canada Partnership agenda includes the Framework of a 
Canada-EU Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA). The topics surrounding the 
TIEA give examples of the different regulatory barriers to trade between Canada and the EU. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, topics to be 
discussed in the TIEA include mutual recognition of professional qualifications, financial 
services, government procurement, e-commerce, temporary entry, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, sustainable development, civil society consultation and science and technology.
11 
With respect to all of these issues, the TIEA framework states that both Canada and the EU 
recognise that improving regulatory cooperation in these areas could facilitate trade and 
investment. For example, difficulties for temporary EU workers to obtain social insurance, 
                                                      
11 Canada-EU TIEA (see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/eu-ue/index.aspx). 16 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
visas, bank accounts and credit approvals, and driver’s license recognition have been raised as 
so-called ‘mode 4’ issues hindering services trade.
12 
Below are five examples that demonstrate how regulatory divergence may affect Canada-EU 
trade. The first example deals with Canadian investment tax credits for scientific research. The 
second example, approval processes for pharmaceuticals, will show how increased cooperation 
could improve market access for both Canada and the EU. The final three examples involve the 
EU’s Green Public Procurement Policies (GPP), the EU REACH Directive and EU withholding 
tax legislation, which will show how an FTA could improve Canadian exports and investment 
in the EU, if an FTA deals with regulatory issues including transparency.  
i. Canadian investment tax credits for scientific research 
As shown in section 2, the EU is a large contributor of FDI in Canada. Current Canadian 
policies with respect to investment tax credits could be improved for EU firms. One example is 
the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax incentive. The SR&ED 
tax incentives consist of three components: a corporate income tax reduction for research 
expenses (which lowers taxable income, and thus, payable taxes); an investment tax credit 
(which directly reduces taxes payable by the amount of the credit); and, in some instances, a tax 
refund (which can be used by companies that do not owe taxes but still incur R&D 
expenditures).
13 
Currently, the SR&ED tax credit is most easily obtained by Canadian Controlled Private 
Corporations (CCPC). As the Aerospace Industry Association of Canada (AIAC) notes: 
A CCPC can benefit from: a) a higher level of tax credit (35% vs 20% for publicly traded 
firms); and b) the refundable nature of the tax credit (a CCPC can receive a cash refund of 
the unused portion even though the credit exceeds the amount of tax payable). [Because] 
tax credits earned by non-CCPC are not refundable, they can only be used to reduce the 
corporate income tax payable.
14 
According to the AIAC, foreign-based corporations do not receive the same tax benefits as 
CCPCs.
15 A Canada-EU FTA that improves the access of EU firms operating in Canada to the 
SR&ED (and other) research and investment tax credits would be beneficial for the EU as many 
EU firms currently invest in the high technology sector in Canada. It should be noted that 
certain EU firms already have similar legislation regarding foreign firms investing in the EU. 
For example, foreign firms in the UK can receive a scientific R&D tax credit of up to 25%.
16 
Improving the access of EU firms to Canadian investment tax credits would encourage EU 
investment in Canada.  
                                                      
12 Conference Board of Canada (2006), “Lost over the Atlantic? The Canada-EU Trade and Investment 
Relationship”, p. 17 (available at http://sso.conferenceboard.ca). 
See also Dehousse et al. (2002), “Business survey on conditions to access to the Canadian market”, CEEI, 
December. 
13 Parliamentary Information and Research Service (2006), “Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development: Tax Policy” (revised 27 July 2006), p. 1 and p. 3. 
14 Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (2006a), “Call For Action”, April, p. 9. 
15 Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (2006b), “Improving the Effectiveness of the SR&ED 
Investment Tax Credits in Supporting Aerospace Technology Development and Commercialization”, 
April.  
16 BBC News (2002), “Foreign Firms Gain at Expense of UK plc’s”, 18 April 
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ii. Pharmaceuticals trade 
The approval processes for pharmaceuticals in both Canada and the EU impede trade between 
the two nations. With respect to Canada, the average time that it takes for the government to 
approve a pharmaceutical is 672 days, compared to 459 days in the United States and 474 days 
in the EU. Part of the reason the process is so long in Canada is that in addition to Federal 
government approval, the provinces have a say. The length of time that it takes for 
pharmaceuticals to be approved in Canada erodes the patent lives of new products. This might 
be good for Canadian generics producers (which make up the bulk of the Canadian industry), 
but has negatively affected EU exports to Canada. In addition to approval times, reimbursement 
policies by provincial governments could be affecting the competitiveness of EU exports.  
With respect to the EU, the approval process for pharmaceuticals falls under the jurisdiction of 
the member state health departments and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The EMA is 
the EU’s first step in creating a harmonised policy for the approval process of pharmaceuticals. 
As the EMA was only created in 2004, its authority is limited to certain types of 
pharmaceuticals. In an effort to improve trade between the US and EU, the Pharmaceutical 
Research Manufacturers of the US have lobbied the US Food and Drug Administration to 
improve its relationship with the EMA. If an FTA was to result in increased information-sharing 
between Canada and the EU, this would benefit two-way trade. It should be noted that Canada 
and the EU have already cooperated on pharmaceutical trade issues with the signing of the 
mutual recognition agreement – the Medicinal Goods Manufacturing Practices Compliance 
Certification Agreement.
17  
iii. The EU REACH Directive 
The REACH Directive is an EU measure that attempts to improve the EU environment by 
regulating chemicals used in the production of products. REACH is one aspect of the EU’s New 
Chemicals Policy (NCP), which replaces 40 pieces of EU legislation regarding chemicals and 
the environment with one directive that covers all aspects of EU chemicals policy. As the name 
suggests, REACH includes three main parts: Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation. 
Registration requires manufacturers (both domestic and foreign) to obtain relevant information 
on their substances and to employ methods contained in that data to manage the substances 
safely. Evaluation, which is undertaken by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), is the task 
of testing new industry products for health risks, as well as checking compliance of industries 
already involved in the selling of registered products. ECHA also has the job of coordinating 
substance evaluation to investigate the perceived risk of certain chemicals that are not yet 
required to be registered. Products and substances that are found to be of very high concern will 
be made subject to authorisation, which requires applicants to demonstrate that the risks 
associated with the products are adequately controlled and that the socio-economic benefits of 
the use of these substances outweigh the risks. Under the authorisation scheme, applicants must 
also analyse whether there are safer alternatives to the substances. If there are adequate 
substitutes, applicants must prepare substitution plans for these substances. It should be noted 
that the European Commission may at any time amend or withdraw any authorisation procedure 
if a suitable substitute becomes available. Also, should a substance fail to pass an authorisation, 
its use will be restricted by the Commission. 
The REACH Directive affects Canadian trade because many of its natural resource exports to 
the EU such as iron ore, zinc and nickel contain small impurities that are considered dangerous 
by REACH. Because Canada trades these minerals in large quantities, the absolute volume of 
                                                      
17 This agreement resulted in the recognition that medicines packaged in Canada would be allowed to 
enter the EU without re-inspection at the border and vice versa. 18 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
the impurities is above REACH’s one tonne limit. Although no econometric studies have been 
performed on the likely trade effects of REACH on Canadian exports, a study by the Minerals 
Council of Australia found that REACH could result in a decrease of Australian lead, zinc and 
nickel exports to the EU by between 21.1-71.5%, 20.3-73.4% and 25.8-75.2%, respectively, by 
2010.
18 Also in the US, the Transatlantic Economic Council expressed concern that REACH 
implementation is “causing serious problems for the export of US chemical products”.
19 
It should be noted that the actual effects of REACH are still unknown and the Directive is very 
new (the law entered into force on 1 June 2007 and the obligation to register began in June 
2008). If Canadian exporters of iron ore, zinc and nickel are required to register chemicals and 
have them authorised, this process will increase production costs for Canadian firms, which 
could cause a loss of competitiveness compared to substitute products that are not subject to 
REACH. 
A Canada-EU FTA will likely have little effect on the REACH Directive, as it is currently under 
implementation. Nevertheless, an FTA that improved regulatory cooperation could prevent 
future EU directives from having negative impacts on Canadian natural resources or other 
exports, as already exists in the context of the EU-US dialogue with the Regulatory Cooperation 
Forum, instituted in January 2006. 
iv. The Green Public Procurement policies of the EU 
The Green Public Procurement (GPP) policies
20 of the EU are designed to reduce pollution by 
increasing both the demand for and supply of ‘green’ products. GPPs are still in their infancy in 
the EU, but are expected to become more prevalent in the next 5-10 years. GPPs may have a 
negative effect on Canadian forest products to the EU as they could result in restrictions on 
Canadian forest products containing certain chemicals. In addition, GPPs allow EU countries to 
rate a foreign country’s manufacturing processes in forest products. The results of the GPP is 
that EU member states now have the right, and are even encouraged, to discriminate against 
products that they feel may pose a problem to human, plant or animal health. Although there are 
no specific agreements on the environment at the WTO level, sustainable development and the 
environment are among the fundamental goals of the WTO as indicated in the Marrakesh 
Agreement which established the WTO. Accordingly, the WTO allows member states to take 
trade-related measures to protect the environment provided that these measures are not used as 
tools for protectionism.  
Examples from Belgium and Denmark suggest the possible negative effects of the EU GPPs on 
Canadian forest product exports. In the case of Belgium, the country has rated Canada’s forest 
products manufacturing processes as second rate, meaning that certain Canadian forest products 
could possibly be restricted from the Belgium market unless these processes are changed. The 
decision by the Belgian authorities could place Canadian producers at a disadvantage compared 
to producers from other countries that were given first-rate certifications by the Belgian 
authorities.
21  
                                                      
18 Minerals Council of Australia (2005), “REACH Factsheet”, May (http://www.minerals.org.au/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0005/8591/REACH_FACTSHEET_050512.pdf). 
19 Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) (2008), Joint Statement of the European Commission and the 
US, 13 May. 
20 GPPs are part of an EU initiative, but can be adopted in different ways by member states. As a 
consequence, the effects of GPP policies will vary depending on the member state. 
21 From the Belgian website for GPPs (www.guidedesachatsdurables.be.fr/productfiles/home.asp). CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 19 
 
With respect to Denmark, that country’s GPP criteria require that certain ‘socio-economic’ 
conditions be met in order for a producer to be considered ‘acceptable’. An issue for Canada is 
that in order for the Danish socio-economic requirement to be fulfilled, the government must 
ensure that “property and land tenure rights as well as legal, customary and traditional rights 
related to forest land and the utilisation of forest resources be clarified, recognised and 
respected”. In addition to this, governments must ensure that “appropriate mechanisms for 
resolving disputes between timber production operators logging in the forests and local people 
should be laid down”.
22 Although the Danish GPP policy has not yet become binding 
legislation, it could result in restrictions on Canadian producers operating in areas with native 
populations where there are outstanding land disputes or other issues with respect to property 
rights.  
The GPP policies demonstrate a perfect example of a country undertaking a policy in order to 
regulate one part of the economy, but which indirectly impacts international trade and supply 
chains. Such policies also remind us that the regulatory environment can evolve over time. This 
requires that an EU-Canada FTA should not only cover regulatory cooperation and 
transparency, but it should also take into account the changing nature of the regulatory 
environment to avoid becoming outdated.  
v. Taxation procedures and securities legislation  
Canadian investment and financial services trade in the EU is hindered by two main regulatory 
obstacles: taxation procedures and differing legislation in issuing and trading securities. These 
barriers not only increase the costs for firms involved in commerce between Canada and the EU, 
but complex regulatory procedures and lack of mutual recognition also discourage firms from 
being active in each other’s markets, and thus reduce transatlantic trade. 
With respect to taxation procedures, Canadian firms are faced with two hindrances: withholding 
taxes and taxation procedures on limited partnerships. Withholding taxes are the amount that are 
withheld by a paying agent on interest and dividend income, and paid to the tax authorities. If 
withholding taxes are credited against tax liabilities of the company in its home country, the 
withholding tax has no effect on cross-border trade. However, according to studies by the 
Canada Europe Round Table for Business (CERT) as well as the C.D. Howe Institute, Canadian 
firms operating in the EU are often not given the opportunity to credit EU withholding taxes, 
which increases the tax burden. Within the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA), this 
has been tackled in the parent/subsidiary Directive (90/435/EEC) and interest/royalty Directive 
(2003/49/EC), but this does not apply to third countries, with the exception of Switzerland. At 
international level, bilateral tax treaties may reduce the incidence of double taxation, but they 
differ largely across countries. As regards partnerships, they are also subject to withholding tax, 
although the tax can in theory be reduced to a treaty rate if an application is made. This process 
is quite onerous for limited partnerships as they generally deal with limited amounts of 
investments. Also, the regulation makes limited partners less competitive compared to domestic 
corporations, which are not subject to the withholding tax.  
In terms of differing legislation in the issuance and trading of securities, increased cooperation 
between Canada and the EU would simplify what is currently a complex process for firms, and 
reduce the overall cost of transatlantic trade. Currently, securities issuance rules, stock exchange 
authorisation and brokers trading rules in Canada and the EU are not mutually recognised. The 
result is that a security issued in one jurisdiction may not be acceptable for public offer in 
another, brokers have no direct access to trade on exchanges in the other’s jurisdiction and 
                                                      
22 From draft version of the Danish GPP policy (www.skovognatur.dk/NR/rdonlyres/EDDB0EC5-E2FC-
494B-880F-D47635696A83/39935/draft_19_30_5.pdf). 20 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
exchanges cannot open their market.
23 Although no study has been done from a Canadian 
perspective, a study by Benn Steil (2002) concluded that full transatlantic integration between 
the United States and the EU would result in a 9% reduction in the cost of capital and a 60% 
reduction in transaction costs for listed companies. The study also found that the cost reductions 
for consumers would also lead to an increase in trading volume of roughly 50%.
24 
It should be added that the EU and Canadian financial markets are not completely integrated in 
the areas of taxation and securities market regulation. Canada’s differing provincial tax and 
securities regulatory structures as well as Canada-US integration (Canada has already aligned its 
investment procedures with the United States in order to facilitate increased cooperation 
between Canadian and American firms)
25 will also make it difficult for Canada and the EU to 
cooperate on financial markets and tax matters. Nevertheless, a Canada-EU FTA could help to 
lay the foundation for increased cooperation in securities markets, analogous to the EU-US 
financial market regulatory dialogue.  
6.  Economic arguments for an EU-Canada FTA 
Trade theory postulates that there would be positive welfare gains to accrue to the EU and 
Canada from tariff elimination (provided that trade creation is greater than trade diversion), 
especially in those product categories where there are tariff peaks, both in agriculture and non-
agricultural goods. In addition to tariffs, effective removal of NTBs, TBTs, SPS and regulatory 
barriers to trade in services and investment can bring substantial additional gains.  
The arguments for an EU-Canada FTA, in this paper, are based only on economic grounds. 
First, from an EU perspective, Canada is a good FTA partner. As outlined in the Commission 
Communication Global Europe: Competing in the World (European Commission, 2006), the 
new trade policy of the EU was to provide market access to European firms in markets that are 
relatively closed in order to increase the competitiveness of the EU to meet the Lisbon Agenda 
goals. Hence the Global Europe Communication identified a number of potential FTA partners 
for the EU based on the following criteria: 
•  Countries or regions with large market potential (market size usually measured by GDP 
multiplied by the growth rate) and 
•  Countries with high tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
As indicated in Table 12, Canada is used as a comparator to some of the EU’s new FTA 
partners such as Korea, India and ASEAN. Compared to these countries/regions, Canada is 
smaller in market potential and is relatively much less protectionist. However, the US and 
Canada trade was also mostly tariff-free and open before CUSFTA was signed and entered into 
force in 1989. Still, the trade that was flowing freely from Canada to the US increased 
approximately 40% over the five years following the agreement. In addition, the imports that 
saw tariff reductions in excess of 5% saw trade increase dramatically to approximately twice its 
1989 level by 1994 (Clausing, 2001). 
                                                      
23 This may be changing, however. The Quebec Financial Markets Authority recently authorised the 
London Stock Exchange to place its screens and offer its stock directly to banks and brokers in Quebec. 
24 B. Steil (2002), “Building a Transatlantic Securities Market”, International Securities Markets 
Association, Zurich, pp. 28-30. 
25 W.A. Dymond and M. Hart (2000), “Dreams and Delusions: The continuing allure of a Canada-EU free 
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Table 12. Market potential and key economic indicators 
 
Market potential* 
(2005-25) 
GDP 
(2005, € billions) 
Annual average 
growth rates (2005-25) 
China 204  1573  6.6 
Japan 74  3920  1.6 
India 58  607  5.5 
ASEAN 57  714  4.9 
South Korea  45  598  4.7 
Mercosur 35  677  3.6 
Canada 28  714  2.6 
* Market potential = Economic size x growth. 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
As can be seen in Table 13, protection rates between Canada and the US were not neglible. In 
1989, only 22.3% of Canadian exports to the US were tariff-free. One significant improvement 
from 1989 to 1994 is the reduction in the tariffs category of rates greater than 5%. According to 
the World Tariff Profiles report (2006), 99.2% of tariff lines are now duty-free for Canadian 
exports to the US, compared with only 20.4% to the EU. A comparison between Tables 13 and 
14 shows that US protection rates in 1989 were similar to the levels of protection in the EU 
today. This implies that there may be similar gains from an EU-Canada FTA. 
Table 13. The pattern of protection in 1989 and 1994 (for US imports from Canada)  
   1989      1994     
  
 % of 
observations   % of imports 
% of 
observations  % of imports 
Free trade    22.3    62.6    26.7    62.7  
Tariffs under 5%   45.0    33.8    60.0    36.6  
Tariffs between 5 and 10%   20.8    3.1    9.3    0.6  
Tariffs between 10 and 25%   10.2    0.5    3.7    0. I  
Tariffs over 25%   1.6    0.0    0.2    0.0  
Source: K. Clausing (2001), “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Canada-US FTA”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics.  
Table 14. European Union tariff profile 
Frequency distribution  Duty-free   0 <= 5   5 <= 10  10 <= 15  15 <= 25  25 <= 50   50 <= 100   > 100 
Agricultural 
products 
  Tariff lines 
(in %)  
          
Final bound     32.5   9.1   15.1   11.7   10.1   10.9   7.6   0.9  
MFN applied   2006  31.1   9.2   15.9   12.2   11.2   10.0   6.3   1.1  
                
Non-agricultural 
products  
              
Final bound     28.4   37.1   26.6   6.9   0.9   0.0   0   0  
MFN applied   2006  28.6   36.4   27.3   6.8   0.8   0.0   0   0  
Source: WTO (2006), World Tariff Profiles. 22 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
As indicated in Figure 1 in section 2, both exports and imports of Canada to the EU have been 
increasing in value, but the shares of Canadian exports to the EU decreased dramatically despite 
an increase in the share of EU imports. This shows that Canadian exports have become more 
concentrated in the US and in some emerging market economies, at the expense of the EU. A 
study by Cameron & Loukine (2001) shows that an FTA between the EU and Canada may 
increase Canadian exports to the EU by 2.5 billion Canadian dollars and imports from the EU 
by 7 billion Canadian dollars, due to tariff elimination. Another recent study by Leblond (2007) 
also finds similar results.  
Some might argue that the main motivation for an EU-Canada FTA may be to counteract the 
‘trade diversion’ that was created by NAFTA (and CUSFTA) at the expense of the EU and to 
the benefit of the US. As argued by Viner (1950), the welfare effect of joining a preferential 
trading area (PTA) such as NAFTA is ambiguous. As a special case of a PTA, an FTA may 
cause both ‘trade creation’ which is welfare enhancing and ‘trade diversion’ which is welfare 
reducing. If Canada has started importing good A from the US instead of importing it from the 
EU, even though the EU was the more efficient producer of that good, then NAFTA must have 
caused some trade diversion. If trade diversion is larger than trade creation, then NAFTA can be 
said to have been welfare reducing for Canada. However, as an examination of the empirical 
literature shows, it is difficult to ascertain the exact magnitude of trade diversion (see e.g. 
Clausing, 2001; Krueger, 1999) (or creation) as this would require considerable and detailed 
information on trade patterns of the EU and the US with Canada, including information on 
intra-industry trade and trade in intermediate goods. One empirical example indicating trade 
diversion created by NAFTA is provided by Wall (2003). He points out that although the 
overall estimated effect of NAFTA on EU-Canada trade has been positive, at the regional level, 
both Eastern and Western Canada experienced large decreases in imports from Europe.       
One of the most difficult aspects of an FTA with Canada for the EU is that EU trade policy is 
still committed to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) within the WTO (as also is Canada). 
Hence starting negotiations with a major developed country before the conclusion of this round 
may send the wrong signal. However, some kind of deal is expected in the DDA by the end of 
the year, even though the results are not going to be far-reaching. Hence if the negotiations start 
after the DDA, they may also cover ground that was not sufficiently dealt with within the DDA. 
Despite the positive aspects described above, there are some arguments against a Canada-EU 
FTA. One, from the Canadian perspective, suggests that because the Canadian economy is so 
deeply integrated into the North American economy, any arrangement with the EU that would 
have any serious impact (i.e. involve regulatory convergence) would compromise more 
important regulatory agreements with the United States.  
The Canadian economy is indeed heavily dependent on the economy of the United States, but 
recent developments have shown that there are reasons for Canada to diversify its exports. The 
recent rise in the Canadian dollar has made Canadian exports less attractive to US consumers, 
which is illustrated by the reduced Canadian exports to the United States in recent years. In 
addition, an appreciation in the value of the euro has coincided with the weakening of the US 
dollar, which has increased the attractiveness of the EU market as a destination for Canadian 
exports. In an increasingly diverse international currency market, it might be in the best interest 
of Canadian exporters to diversify, as this could help to make Canadian firms more resilient to 
business cycles in the United States. From an international policy point of view, concluding a 
trade agreement with another trade bloc may be a useful way to signal to US policy-makers this 
deliberate choice of Canadian policy-makers to underpin the diversification. 
In summary, the case for an EU-Canada FTA should be based on economic gains. The effects of 
removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, TBTs, SPSs and regulatory barriers to trade have been 
discussed above. Arguments against an EU-Canada FTA are generally motivated by political CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 23 
 
considerations and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. It can be concluded, however, 
that if large economic gains can be expected, this may drive the political agenda in the direction 
of more support for an EU-Canada FTA. 
7. Conclusions 
The main discussions in this report can be summarised in four points. First, an examination of 
trade flows and FDI positions in section 2 has demonstrated that both in terms of trade and FDI 
the EU is a significant trading partner for Canada; and to a lesser extent, Canada is a relatively 
important trading partner for the EU. Second, this paper has shown that although average MFN 
tariffs are low, there are many tariff lines with duties. In fact, in terms of tariffs, the level of 
protection in the EU market today is similar to the levels of protection in the US in 1989 when 
CUSFTA was signed. In addition to tariff barriers, there are many non-tariff barriers as well as 
technical barriers to trade in industrial goods and sanitary and phytosanitary standards in 
agricultural goods that impede trade between the EU and Canada.  
Third, as highlighted in the Global Europe Communication, any FTA that the EU negotiates has 
to be ‘WTO+’, including services and investment liberalisation. As indicated in the sections on 
NTBs and regulatory barriers to trade, there are many trade irritants that can be tackled through 
an FTA between the EU and Canada to further liberalise trade in services and investment. 
Finally, the argument for an EU-Canada FTA should be based on economic motivations, rather 
than political reasoning. Political reasoning without an economic rationale will not get far. 
However, even if the economic rationale has low political support in the beginning, that support 
may increase if the benefits can be shown to outweigh the costs.  
In this paper, we argue that there are significant economic gains from a potential EU-Canada 
FTA. The evolution of trade between the US and Canada after the signing of CUSFTA in 1989 
is a good example to show how trade might increase. First, the patterns and levels of protection 
between the EU and Canada today are very similar to the protection that existed between the US 
and Canada when CUSFTA was signed. Second, as mentioned in section 6, even though a large 
percentage of trade between the US and Canada was free before CUSFTA, as is the case for EU 
and Canada today, there has been an increase of 40% in trade in goods that were already tariff-
free. For those goods, where there has been more than a 5% reduction in tariffs, trade has 
doubled in the five years following CUSFTA. The positive effect of tariff liberalisation of an 
EU-Canada FTA on exports-imports is also supported by the results of some empirical studies 
as mentioned in the previous sections. Finally, it should be noted that these potential gains only 
take into account tariff liberalisation. Experience and quantitative analysis (e.g. using CGE 
models) suggest that there should be further gains from the removal of NTBs, and from services 
and investment liberalisation. 
The right policy approach to an EU-Canada FTA is to acknowledge that a trade deal would be 
welfare enhancing for Canada. Even though, as mentioned in previous sections, there is scarce 
empirical evidence that either CUSFTA or NAFTA has caused any trade diversion, in reality it 
is possible to find more evidence that some trade has been diverted away from the EU. As it is 
very difficult to get information on the detailed patterns of trade between countries like Canada, 
the US and the EU where intra-industry trade and trade in intermediate goods dominate, it is 
difficult to measure the exact extent of trade diversion. In a previous section, it was shown that 
EU exports to Canada have in fact increased since 1980 from 10% (of Canada’s world imports) 
to 14% in 2006. However, even though the EU’s overall exports to Canada increased in value 
and share, such aggregate figures can hide trade diversion that might have occurred at a 
disaggregate level as suggested by the Wall study.  24 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
The benefits from an EU-Canada FTA have to be large enough to divert Canadian exporters’ 
attention away from the US to the EU. It was shown above that although Canadian exports to 
the EU increased in value terms, there has been a dramatic decrease in shares from over 14% in 
1980 to 7% in 2006. If an FTA removes most non-zero EU tariffs as well as NTBs, TBTs and 
SPS and brings services and investment liberalisation, the gains may be large enough for 
Canadian exporters to diversify away from the US. On the EU side, even though exports to 
Canada have been increasing both in value and market share, tariff liberalisation alone can 
increase EU competitiveness vis-à-vis the US. The EU faces significant levels of protection in 
Canada, where 56.5% of tariff lines are free, but 34% of tariff lines have duty rates above 5% in 
industrial goods.  
On a product-by-product case, a rough rule of thumb is that there is a case for an EU-Canada 
FTA despite Canada’s close ties with the US if the gains from removing the tariffs are larger 
than the cost of transport to the EU. As explained above, Canada’s motivations for 
diversification away from the US are warranted. For the EU, however, the most crucial aspect of 
a potential FTA with Canada is that it will level the playing field between the EU and the US. 
The increased competitiveness of the US due to its FTA with Canada and its long-standing 
market shares due to its first-mover advantages will be hard to pull away from, but not 
impossible. In fact, Canada’s motives for diversification and the EU’s challenge to increase 
market share in the presence of a strong US are perfectly compatible.  
Significant disagreements have arisen even before the start of the negotiations over the tariff 
liberalisation schedules for agricultural products. The European side has voiced concern over 
the fact that agricultural goods are going to be a major problem. It is very important that 
agriculture is included in trade negotiations as there are significant economic gains to both sides 
from trade liberalisation. If the EU can negotiate tariff liberalisation in agricultural products 
with Chile, Mexico, South Africa and now with Korea, it should be able to do so with Canada as 
well. If agriculture is left out of a potential FTA with Canada, this would send contradictory and 
protectionist signals to other (especially developing) countries as European trade Commissioner 
Peter Mandelson had just warned against protectionist tendencies in the current environment of 
increasing food prices and concerns over food security. One possible path may be for the EU to 
follow two-track negotiations with Canada: one set of fast-track negotiations to conclude tariff 
liberalisation in industrial goods, removal of NTBs and services and investment liberalisation, 
and another, slower track of negotiations on tariff liberalisation schedules on agri-foodstuffs.  
Regarding concerns over the support (or lack of support) for multilateral negotiations, they may 
find their own solution. One way or another, the Doha round must be finalised by the end of this 
year. If negotiations can wait until after the DDA is completed, this would take the pressure off 
the pro camp, and weaken the hand of the opposition.  | 25 
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Appendix  
Top Canadian exports to the EU       
Top 15 products (HS6 Codes)       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
284410 – Natural Uranium and its compounds   885    1,303    3,367 
710812 - Gold in unwrought form   1,897    3,069    2,911 
750120 - Nickel Oxide Sinters   505    732    1,394 
710210 - Unsorted Diamonds   1,263    1,032    1,215 
880240 – Aircraft NES of an Unladen Weight (more than 15,000 kg)   439    1,215    1,122 
750210 - Nickel, Unwrought, Not Alloyed   426    403    967 
760110 - Unwrought Aluminium - Not Alloyed   176    355    726 
270112 - Bitminous Coal   841    799    714 
710231 - Diamonds, Non-Industrial - Unworked   381    521    575 
851770 - Parts of Tel Sets   -    -    573 
711230 - Ash containing Precious Metal    342    400    549 
260112 - Iron Ores and Concentrates, Other than Iron Pyrates   539    561    522 
480100 - Newsprint, in rolls or sheets   479    328    514 
470321 - Chemical Woodpulp   733    540    512 
880230 - Airplanes of an Unladen Weight (2,001 - 15,000 kg)   263    588    419 
      
Top EU exports to Canada       
Top 15 products (HS6 Codes)       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
270900 - Crude Petroleum oils   4,354    5,099    5,079 
300490 - Medicaments NES in Dosage   3,439    4,099    4,137 
271011 - Light Petroleum oil Preparations (Including Gasoline)   1,629    2,152    1,762 
870323 - Motor Vehicles, Cylinder Capacity 1501-3000 cc   1,389    1,690    1,738 
870324 - Motor Vehicles, Cylinder Capacity +3000 cc   927    1,249    1,375 
880330 - Parts of Airplanes or Helicopters NES   938    940    860 
220421 - Grape Wines - Other than sparkling    595    689    743 
293410 - Heterocyclic Compounds containing an Unfused Thiazole 
Ring in the Structure   78    800    613 
841191 - Parts of Turbo-jets or Turbo-propellers   474    604    573 
841112 - Turbo-jets Thrust exceeding 25 KN   350    248    460 CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 27 
 
843149 - Parts of Cranes, Work Trucks, Construction Machinery   289    315    367 
300210 - Anticera and other Blood Fractions   172    230    322 
271019 - Heavy Petroleum oil Preparations   355    222    320 
841199 - Parts of Gas Turbines NES   269    216    303 
220300 - Beer made from Malt   242    261    297 
 
Top Canadian Exports to EU Member States 
 
Top Canadian exports to the United Kingdom       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
710812 - Gold    1,888    3,068    2,887 
284410 - Natural Uranium   281    761    2,145 
750120 - Nickel   499    732    1,393 
710210 - Unsorted Diamonds   738    484    588 
711230 - Ash Containing Precious Metals   333    391    535 
880240 - Aircrafts NES (more than 15,000 kg)   121    348    435 
      
Top Canadian exports to the Netherlands       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
760110 - Unwrought Aluminum   161    355    611 
284410 - Natural Uranium and its compounds   159    208    532 
750210 - Nickel    109    137    453 
270112 - Bituminous Coal   92    143    113 
970110 - Paintings and Drawing (by hand)   107    85    106 
271019 - Heavy Petroleum oil Preparations   131    193    103 
      
Top Canadian exports to Germany       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
260112 - Iron Ores and Concentrates, agglomerated   324    350    236 
260111 - Iron Ores and Concentrates, non-agglomerated   92    91    204 
270112 - Bituminous Coal   189    233    186 
284410 - Natural Uranium and its Compounds   162    69    155 
260300 - Copper ores and Concentrates   0    78    151 
841191 - Parts of Turbo-Jets   96    125    124 28 | GUERIN & NAPOLI 
 
Top Canadian exports to France       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
 2005  2006  2007 
284410 - Natural Uranium and its compounds   282    265    536 
841112 - Turbo Jets   148    123    205 
880330 - Parts of Airplanes or helicopters   137    140    153 
841122 - Turbo Propellers   26    51    90 
300220 - Vaccines - Human Uses   75    98    88 
480100 - Newsprint - in rolls or sheets   60    69    86 
 
EU Member State Top Exports to Canada  
Top German exports to Canada       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
  2005 2006 2007 
870323 - Motor Vehicles Cylinder Capacity 1501-3000 cc  867   1,105   1,245 
300490 - Medicaments in Dosage  609   799   925 
870324 - Motor Vehicles Cylinder Capacity +3000 cc  584   723   835 
844313 - Offset Printing Machinery  -   -   111 
850231 - Electric Generating sets - Wind Powered  4    97   107 
841191 - Parts of Turbo Jets   76    78   105 
     
Top UK exports to Canada       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
  2005 2006 2007 
270900 - Crude Petroleum Oils  3,648   3,937   4,377 
300490 - Medicaments NES - in Dosage  617   903    782 
880330 - Parts of Airplanes or Helicopters  759   654   629 
841112 - Turbo Jets  130   186    398 
841199 - Parts of Gas Turbines  231    179   247 
870324 - Motor Vehicles Cylinder Capacity +3000 cc  157   218   218 
     
Top French dxports to Canada       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
  2005 2006 2007 
300490 - Medicaments in Dosage   377   502   509 
220421 - Grape Wines  282   313   325 
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880330 - Parts of Airplanes   93   80   105 
330499 - Beauty or Make up Preparations NES    87   83    102 
330300 - Perfumes and Toilet Waters  79   77   86 
     
Top Italian exports to Canada       
Canadian dollars (millions)       
  2005 2006 2007 
220421 - Grape Wines   206    253   281 
300490 - Medicaments NES in Dosage   174    200   151 
841989 - Other Non-Domestic Machinery, Plant or Laboratory Equipment for 
Heat Treatment of Materials  7   7    127 
271011 - Light Petroleum Oil Preparations (including Gasoline)  161   254   119 
690890 - Tiles and Ceramic  95    92   95 
848180 - Taps, Cocks Valves and other Similar Appliances  76   79   81 
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